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Introduction
Until recently, defined benefit plans in the public sector offered public employees a reliable income in retirement without the responsibility of making important investment choices. This has changed in recent years as a shift away from defined benefit only systems to public systems with defined contribution and hybrid plan options has emerged. New employees in these systems now must make critical financial decisions, such as what type of plan to choose and how to allocate contributions among asset choices. In the long run, these decisions will directly affect the employees' financial well being in retirement. Given the documented low levels of financial literacy in the U.S., it is natural to wonder if public plans are helping prepare members to make financial decisions and, if so, what approaches they are taking. While data to answer these questions exist for the private sector where defined contribution plans prevail, there is little public information available to address these questions in the public sector. To fill this gap, this paper presents new survey evidence from large state primary systems with a specific focus on those that offer plan and investment choice. This survey documents the type of financial education and advice offered to members. In addition, the evidence from plans with choice is contrasted with data collected from state systems offering only a defined benefit option.
This paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 begins by discussing why financial literacy matters. The section documents the lack of financial literacy in the U.S. and how it may affect financial decisions. Section 3 continues with a short overview of the literature related to the effectiveness of financial education and advice associated with retirement plans and describes an important legal distinction between advice and education that plan sponsors must consider. In addition, this section addresses the different legal environments facing public and private plans. Section 4 provides details behind the recent public sector shift away from defined benefit only systems and offers reasons why this new trend has lagged the private sector movement. In addition, this section highlights important differences between public and private sector employees and explains why this matters in the context of financial decisions and literacy. Section 5 presents the new results from the National Public Pension Plan Financial Education Survey and contrasts these findings with evidence from the private sector. The final section provides conclusions and implications.
Financial Literacy: Why Might it Matter?
Studies consistently find that Americans generally lack an understanding of basic financial concepts. For example, Lusardi and Mitchell (2011a) find in a recent survey of American adults that less than one third (30 percent) of respondents can correctly answer three basic questions related to interest rates, inflation and risk diversification. Their findings are in line with earlier studies (for example, Bernheim 1998; Hilgert et al. 2003) . Many studies also find that certain demographic groups score significantly lower than others and these patterns are consistent across many countries (Mitchell and Lusardi 2011b) . In most studies, women, individuals with less education and younger people underperform in financial literacy tests. As women and the least educated individuals currently have the highest poverty rates in old age and statistics suggest that younger people are not actively saving, these findings are of particular concern (Munnell 2004; Smeeding et al. 2011). 1 Additional research suggests that lack of financial knowledge can influence financial decision-making related to retirement. 2 For example, Lusardi and Mitchell (2011a) find that individuals who cannot correctly answer their basic financial questions are less likely to be retirement planners. They confirm the causality from financial literacy to retirement planning using an instrumental variable approach. Given that research demonstrates that planners accumulate more retirement wealth than non-planners, it follows that low financial literacy can lead to inadequate savings outcomes (for example, Lusardi and Beeler, 2007; Lusardi and Mitchell 2007 a,b, 2011) . In addition, Mottola and Utkus (2008) find that less financially sophisticated investors are more likely to hold inappropriately conservative asset allocations in their retirement plans leading to substantial welfare losses. Furthermore, Agnew and Szykman (2005) and Brown, Farrell and Weisbenner (2011) find that individuals with less financial knowledge are significantly more likely to invest in the default option. In these cases, if the defaults are not carefully chosen, suboptimal retirement outcomes may result (Goda and Manchester 2010) . Taken together, these studies highlight why basic financial literacy matters.
Beyond basic financial knowledge, many Americans also frequently are unaware of the benefits and features of their own retirement plans and display an inability to correctly answer basic questions about common asset types , Gustman and Steinmeir 2004 , Mitchell 1988 . We consider plan knowledge and asset awareness to be important components of financial literacy as it seems unreasonable to expect participants to respond appropriately to plan incentives, such as employer matches, or effectively allocate their portfolios if they are unaware of their plan features and asset choices. Research supports this by providing evidence that lack of plan knowledge relates to poor plan decisions. For example, Agnew et al. (2012) find that individuals are less likely to participate in their 401(k) plan if they are unaware that their company offers a match, regardless of the enrollment arrangement. 3 Furthermore, Brown et al. (2011) report that individuals with basic and more advanced knowledge of their plan features are more likely to make active decisions and not default. Finally, according to Chan and Stevens (2008) , individuals who are knowledgeable about their plan features are more responsive to plan features than those who are less informed, who are more likely react to their own misperceptions of the plan features.
One final consideration is that financial illiteracy may also make it difficult for individuals to process the financial information they are given. If they are overwhelmed by the information, they may resort to relying on simple heuristics to make important decisions or procrastinate. In addition, educational materials and decision aids may not be helpful to them. Research suggests that those with low financial literacy are more prone to feelings of 'information overload.' Recent work also suggests that satisfaction and regret with decisions made can be linked to information issues experienced while making the decision (Agnew and Szykman, 2011, Brown et al. 2011 ). More research is needed to fully understand this relationship but these initial findings suggest that this is another problem possibly rooted in financial illiteracy.
2 While this paper focuses on the relationship between financial literacy and financial decisions related to retirement, Lusardi and Mitchell (2011b) provide a short review of additional literature that links financial literacy with other financial decisions, such as stock market participation, borrowing behavior and mutual fund selection. In addition, Calvet, Campbell and Sodini (2009) use an extensive Swedish dataset to relate a financial sophistication index to three commonly made investment mistakes: underdiversification, inertia in risk taking and the disposition effect in direct stockholdings. 3 One important caveat to this study is that the assumption that the direction of causality runs from plan knowledge to participation was not tested. Therefore, it is possible that participants acquired plan knowledge through their participation.
In total, the evidence presented here provides a convincing argument that not only basic financial knowledge but plan specific literacy and asset awareness matter. Given the documented widespread financial illiteracy in the U.S., these results present considerable challenges to plan sponsors whose members must often make complex financial decisions that will affect their retirement outcomes.
Financial Education and Advice in Retirement Plans: Regulatory Issues and Effectiveness
Given the complicated financial decisions individuals face in retirement plans, particularly in defined contribution and hybrid plans, questions naturally arise regarding how and if plan providers address financial literacy issues and whether their efforts are effective. One important factor that directly shapes the availability and format of the education and advice provided is the existing legislation focused on financial education and advice. It is relevant as plans sponsors may harbor concerns about their liability if their financial programs lead an individual to an unsatisfactory outcome. Therefore, this section begins with a discussion of the regulatory environment pertaining to retirement plans and financial programs in both the public and private sector. We also provide descriptions of different types of financial education and advice options as defined by law.
One of the most important pieces of legislation that has significantly affected plan education and advice programs is the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Concerns about conflicts of interest by plan fiduciaries providing advice for a fee existed when this legislation was drafted. As a result, the act specifically includes 'prohibited transaction rules' disallowing advisors from providing fiduciary-type investment advice that produces fees or benefits to the advisor or its affiliates. Over the ensuing years, written guidance from the Department of Labor (DOL) and the passage of the Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA) have provided private plan sponsors with additional clarification regarding the definition of advice, what constitutes education and what type of advice is exempt from the prohibited transaction rules. 4 This additional legislation and guidance has allayed many liability concerns that in the past may have deterred private plan sponsors from providing education and advice programs to members. Importantly, this guidance and legislation only covers private plans and does not cover public plans.
Public plans face a much more variable regulatory environment than do private plans. According to an industry legal expert, public plans are subject to common law trust principles within individual jurisdictions. These same principles relate to the ERISA standards. However, states vary regarding whether they codify common law trust concepts in statute or rely on case law interpretation. Thus, public plans do not benefit from one national standardized set of guidance and legislation as private plans do. ERISA case law and DOL guidance often play a role when state and local plan sponsors make decisions and, therefore, in practice public plans often follow these guidelines. However, public plans do not receive any of the legal protections afforded to private plans under these acts. Thus, it is not known whether liability concerns might affect the delivery of financial education and advice in some public plans. Therefore, a separate analysis of the public system is necessary to determine whether the various public plans, do or do not offer the financial education and advice programs available in private plans.
So what legally constitutes financial education and advice? As it stands now, guidance from the DOL states that information about plan features, investment alternatives, investing concepts, and asset allocation portfolios designed for hypothetical individuals are considered to be education rather than advice. In addition, there is a fine line drawn between what is considered guidance and advice under the law. According to ERISA, advice is a recommendation that is immediately actionable. Thus, a recommendation to invest in a specific fund is advice but a nearly identical recommendation to invest in a fund type without mention of a specific fund is considered guidance. This is because the latter recommendation is not immediately actionable. This very subtle distinction is clearly illustrated in Chalmers and Reuter (2012) . Finally, according to the PPA, advisors can provide recommendations under the PPA 'prohibited transaction exemption' if they are affiliated with the underlying investments as long as they adhere to very specific conditions. Examples include ensuring that an unbiased computer model that has been certified by an independent third party makes the portfolio recommendations or that advisors receive level compensation. As a result of this guidance and legislation, plans now may provide a broad array of educational offerings and advice services to participants. Whether or not these offerings are effective is a continuing source of active academic research, since the time plans began offering financial education. While not a comprehensive summary, we will now highlight some of the major findings in this area.
Not surprisingly, the financial education and advice programs addressed in the academic research follow the history of the services and education products popular at the time. Early academic research focuses mainly on traditional educational efforts, including written communications about the company's retirement plans, information about the financial markets and/or financial education seminars. Clark and d`Ambrosio (2003) provide a brief summary of this literature. They conclude that these early studies show a positive impact of financial education on savings behavior. Likewise, Bernheim and Garrett (2003) find using a survey of households that the availability of employer-based financial education relates positively to various measures of asset accumulation. Additionally Bayer, Bernheim and Scholz (2009) using evidence from an annual survey of employers offering voluntary savings programs, find that participation rates and contribution rates are higher for companies that offer frequent seminars and the education effects are greater for non-highly compensated employees. Lusardi (2004) also finds financial education seminars can dramatically increase wealth for families with low education and at the bottom of the wealth distribution.
On the negative side, Choi, Laibson, Madrian and Metrick (2002) and Clark and d'Ambrosio (2003) provide evidence that when the effectiveness of employer education is judged based on subsequent investment behavior and not on intentions following the seminar, the success is more limited. New insight from the growing literature in behavioral finance is providing explanations for why this inaction occurs. Most notably, research suggests that individuals follow the path of least resistance (Choi et al. 2006) . Therefore, seemingly simple extra steps, for example requiring employees to fill in a large enrollment form, may prove enough of an obstacle to keep many employees from acting on their intentions. In addition, the behavioral finance literature also provides solutions to help employees overcome the psychological barriers they face. For example, new studies show that simplifying processes can improve behavior in these cases. Beshears et al. (2012) test whether providing employees simple "Quick Enrollment" and "Easy Escalation" cards improves savings behavior in retirement plans. They find significant increases in participation and contribution rates. In addition, social marketing approaches are proving successful. Lusardi, Keller and Keller (2008) consider obstacles to savings in their university plan and they develop a planning aid to help at-risk new employees overcome selfcontrol issues which triples participation compared to a control group.
More recent research tests new services available via the internet, employs field study approaches and connects survey evidence to administrative data. Clark et al. (2012) provide a summary of a number of different large-scale projects they are working on that include studies using these new approaches. Their research supports earlier findings suggesting that financial education programs improve behavior. They find seminars increase both financial knowledge and retirement plan knowledge immediately and one year following participation in a seminar. They also document in preliminary work that individual retirement goals, such as the respondent's planned age of retirement, are affected by the new knowledge acquired.
Using a field study, Clark et al. (2012) test the efficacy of informational flyers mailed to non-participants and find that this information can significantly increase plan participation for the youngest workers (aged 18-24) versus the control group. However, they report that a significant difference was not found for older individuals. This suggests that a single educational effort or communication approach may not work for all. Choi et al. (2012) also use a field study to test how e-mail communications can affect behavior. Targeted e-mails are a cost-effective way for plan sponsors to educate and communicate with employees. In their study, the researchers find that very small changes, such as the content of e-mail reminders to employees about contributions, influence savings rates. Both papers demonstrate the value of field-testing educational efforts for effectiveness.
Finally, the guidance from DOL and the passage of the PPA have made advice services more available. These advice services come in many forms, including face-to-face consultations, on-line advice engines and managed account services that allow the participant to hand over the management of their 401(k) portfolio to an outside party. Research into these products suggests that different types of advice appeal to different types of people. For example, several studies find that participants opting to use online advice and managed accounts tend to differ based on demographics (Agnew 2009; Madamba and Utkus 2012; Financial Engines and Hewitt 2010) . In terms of brokerage services, Chalmers and Reuter (2012) find that younger, less highly educated and less highly paid employees prefer a plan offering broker services to one without. 5 As far as effectiveness, the results vary. Ameriks (2001) conducts an analysis of the influence of a software-guided system and finds that the advice sessions have "a significant, positive impact on the likelihood that participants will reallocate assets or begin directing contributions to recommended investment accounts that were not being used prior to the guidance session." Two newer studies written by financial firms who provide these services suggest that managed accounts lead to better portfolios with less extreme allocations, as well as less assets invested in company stock (Madamba and Utkus 2012; Financial Engines and Hewitt 2010) . In addition, Chalmers and Reuter (2012) find marked differences between the broker portfolios and non-broker portfolios in public pension plans, with the former associated with greater risk. Finally, participants may be more responsive to advice if they seek it. In an experiment, Hung and Yoong (2010) find that defined contribution participants that actively seek advice are more likely to follow the advice versus those who receive unsolicited advice. 6
As is stands now, the extant research provides evidence that retirement plan financial education appears to work and offers mixed evidence regarding advice. The findings also raise questions and suggest that one-size-fits-all approaches may not work for communicating educational facts or providing services. That said, the promising new trend towards field studies and the large-scale projects underway, as well as the opportunity to incorporate behavioral finance theory into educational methods, suggests that many of these questions will be answered in the future. Importantly, the literature stream will benefit from the more rigorous testing methods afforded by the field study approach which can be used to test new ideas as well as confirm old findings.
The Public Sector versus the Private Sector: Plan Trends and Employee Types
The recent shift towards defined contribution and hybrid plans in the public sector is well documented (Beshears et al. (2011) and Munnell (forthcoming) ). This transition away from defined benefit plans has significantly lagged movement in the private market, where in 2008 approximately 69 percent of private sector workers with pension coverage were covered by only a defined contribution option and not a defined benefit plan. In comparison, 97 percent of covered state and local public workers in 2010 were covered by a DB plan. However, this statistic is changing as now 14 states currently offer a primary defined contribution plan component for some or all of their employees. The recent global financial crisis has accelerated the change as fiscal realities have prompted many more states to review their pension systems.
Munnell (forthcoming) attributes the delay in the public transition to defined contribution plans to several factors including, but not limited to, the public sector's relatively higher unionization, more stable firm structure, and less costly regulatory environment relative to the private sector. She also notes that change in the public sector often requires a lengthy political process, which is an obstacle not faced by private firms. Finally, she highlights the distinct nature of the public sector work force, which differs from the private sector across several dimensions. For example, public workers tend to be older, more educated and have longer job tenures. In addition, using the University of Michigan's 1996 Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Munnell (forthcoming) finds highly risk-averse individuals are also significantly more likely to work in the public sector. 7 She theorizes that employees who are more risk averse, older and with longer job tenures are more likely to favor a defined benefit system. It follows, she contends, that the public sector may have continued to offer defined benefit plans to attract this type of employee. Statistics also show that a higher percentage of public employees are women compared to the private sector. (ING 2011) . The study finds that only 26 percent of the respondents indicate that they are risk-takers. Furthermore, using the Merrill-Reid personality typing system, ING reports that a majority consider themselves good team players that prefer stability to risk. Only 9 percent categorized themselves as a "Director," who among other things, is confident, decisive, determined and a risk-taker. When asked about their retirement investment style, 50 percent considered themselves conservative, meaning they wanted to protect savings and avoid losses. Forty four percent were moderate investors and six percent considered themselves aggressive investors. 8 The majority of information in Table 1 was collected from state and plan-level Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFRs), the Public Plans Database (2010), and pension system websites. the column header 'Primary Plan Options,' each plan is sorted into a category based on the plan's type (either DC (defined contribution), DB (defined benefit) or hybrid) and how the plan is selected or not selected by employees (Mandatory or Choice). The 'Mandatory DC' and 'Mandatory Hybrid' categories imply that employees have no choice but to participate in that specific plan. Similarly, a 'DB only' categorization indicates that only a DB option is available to the employees. The categories 'DC choice', 'DB choice,' and 'Hybrid choice' indicate that the plan is part of a 'choice set' from which employees can select their retirement plan. The choice sets are bolded and the default option is denoted with superscript D. It is possible for a state plan to be mandatory for some employees and part of a choice set for others. In this case, both categories are put in the column and the order reflects how many employees have this option available. The category that describes the situation for most of the plan members is listed first.
This table immediately reveals one of the complications of state retirement systems. In many states, there is not one plan available to all employees but often many different plans offered to workers based on their type of employment. This is one reason that understanding the state public plan system is difficult. In addition, plan eligibility may be based on time of hire. In some cases, new employees may be required to join plans that offer choice, while older employees may be restricted to their original options or given an option to change 9 . It all depends on the state. To add further complexity, in some states, certain employees may be able to choose their type of plan, while at the same time other employees may be required to participate in a plan chosen by the state. This is the current case in Virginia where a subset of state employees, including higher education workers, political appointees and school superintendents, may choose to join an optional DC plan, the ORP, instead of the DB plan that is mandatory for other state employees. This is evident by looking at the 'Primary Plan Options' column under the Virginia state heading. For Virginia Retirement System (VRS), 'DB only' is the first category that is listed and applies to most employees. 'DB choice' is the second category in bold that only applies to the subset. Employees eligible for the ORP plans that choose not to participate are defaulted into the VRS, as indicated by the superscript D next to 'DB choice.' In 2014, new state and local employees and teachers in the state will be enrolled in a new Virginia hybrid plan, with once again a small subset given the choice between the current ORP and the new hybrid.
With regard to financial education, it can be argued that the recent public plan trend towards more choice increases the need for financial literacy in its membership. While the public workforce tends to be more educated, a characteristic generally associated with greater financial literacy, there are certain public constituencies that may need more assistance than others. For example, several public plans cater to K-12 teachers only. ING present statistics from their K-12 public plans documenting that this group tends to be predominately women. This is a group identified by research as having a higher risk for low financial literacy. In addition, the ING survey finds that a large majority of this group have not developed a plan for retirement (ING 2010) . Finally, it is still an outstanding question whether the risk aversion of public workers in general adversely influences their financial choices or not. If as a result they invest in inappropriately conservative portfolios, Mottola and Utkus (2008) calculate very high associated welfare costs with this strategy. Therefore, depending on the findings, financial education may also be helpful in this context.
The National Public Pension Plan Financial Education Survey
For years, the Plan Sponsor Council of America (PSCA) has conducted annual surveys on education provided in private plans. In their 2010 report, they highlight the most common approaches to education among these plans, provide information regarding the different program goals and offer statistics related to the developers of the programs (PSCA 2010). Unfortunately, this type of information is not readily available for public plans and, as a result, little is known about the educational and advice practices in this sector. Seeking to fill this gap, we fielded over the January to June 2012 time frame the first National Public Pension Plan Financial Education Survey. The survey focuses specifically on DC and hybrid state plans. While decisions associated with defined benefit plans sometimes can be complicated, DC and hybrid plans by design require many more choices influencing retirement outcomes. As a result, it is arguable that education and advice are more necessary in these types of savings vehicles. Table 2 , Panels A and B outline the state primary DC and hybrid plans targeted for the survey. We specifically chose large primary state systems. We exclude plans serving very small constituencies. 10 However, we do include new primary state plans that at the moment may be small but can be expected to cover a substantial number of employees within the next several years. Table 2 , Panel A provides a list of the mandatory primary state plans we study while Table  2 , Panel B provides a list of the targeted plans that are offered as part of a selection of plans available to employees. These tables include the market value of the plans assets.
At first glance, these tables may initially lead to some confusion as one state's name may appear under multiple subcategories. For example, Michigan appears under both 'Mandatory Hybrid' and 'Mandatory DC' subcategories in Table 2 , Panel A. A closer look reveals that the official plan names that follow the Michigan name in the tables are different. It is these specific plan names that are the keys to understanding the tables. By referring back to Table 1 , readers can learn more about each official plan and the types of employees eligible to participate in them. For example, Table 2 Table 1 the eligibility for this plan. We find this plan serves only employees of public schools, district libraries, and certain schools and universities.
In addition to the DC and hybrid plans listed in Table 2 Panel A and B, we did solicit responses from major defined benefit systems and city systems. Our full dataset includes approximately 50 percent of the state defined benefit only systems. While not the focus of our research, we will discuss some of the anecdotal findings from their responses later on. Importantly, before survey respondents took the survey, they were told upfront that their responses would be anonymous and aggregated. This was necessary to ensure a high response rate. To adhere to this condition, we will not present results by plan level nor highlight which plans completed the survey. Table 3 provides the aggregated statistics for our survey respondents and our survey population. For mandatory DC and hybrid plans, we have responses for 80 percent of the plans, representing roughly 54 percent of active participants. For DC and hybrid plans that are part of a choice set offered to members, we collected responses from 87 percent of plans, representing 96 percent of active participants. Combined, this equates to a response rate of 84 percent of the possible 25 plans and 69 percent of active participants. For DB plans that are offered as a choice set, we have data on 89 percent of the active population.
Before moving to the discussion of the financial education programs, Table 4 provides information about important features of the plans surveyed, such as the presence of automatic enrollment and automatic escalation, whether a default investment option is offered and vesting. In addition, it provides details regarding what type of employee (new hires only or most employees) have access to these options. This information is relevant as these features are useful ways to guide behavior in plans, especially if members are not financially literate. Practitioners often debate whether certain features like automatic enrollment and automatic escalation should be used as substitutes or complements to financial education and advice. Not surprisingly, when plans are mandatory, automatic enrollment is always offered, whereas this is not the case when plans are part of a choice set. In the latter case, it is likely that the small percentage of plans that offer automatic enrollment in the choice contexts are the default DC and hybrid plans in the set. Automatic escalation is not a feature in most plans regardless of the type. Data presented in Beshears et al. (2011) provides some insight for this finding. In their study of primary defined contribution plans focused on general employees, they find that plans often have mandatory contribution levels for employees. Thus, the employee does not set the contribution level nor, in some cases, have the ability to increase it. As a result, automatic escalation in these instances is not necessary. Another interesting finding is that default investment options exist in plans offered in a choice set. This is also consistent with Beshears et al. (2011) findings that many opt-in plans also have a default investment option. Some plans do offer matches but they are not offered universally. In addition, most plans come with vesting requirements. Table 5 combines the choice and mandatory DC and hybrid plans and reports the aggregated responses to questions regarding education and advice programs. Of those surveyed, all of the plans offered some sort of financial education and/or advice with the most popular option being one-on-one telephone consultations. The table sorts the options available by the percentage of actives with access to each option. The table also includes an additional measure, the percentage of plans offering the educational program. This allows comparisons with the PSCA data. Often, but not always, the popularity of the option follows the same ranking for these two metrics. The next most popular options available to over 90 percent of the surveyed respondents include group seminars, periodic newsletters, live webinars, and new hire information packets. Additionally, approximately three-quarters of actives have access to third party online financial advice. One-on-one in person consultations and internet options (financial education web component and online videos) are offered to little more than half of actives. While over half the plans use e-mails, it only equates to 19 percent of the active member population. This could indicate smaller plans are using this option more than larger plans. The least popular approach is social media. PSCA's 2010 results report that for private plans, the most popular education provided includes enrollment kits (70.2 percent of plans), seminars/workshops (63.5 percent), internet/intranet (59.3 percent), e-mail (52.5 percent) and fund performance sheets (44 percent). In addition, PSCA reports that 57.6 percent of plans offer investment advice. 11 Of those offering investment advice, 58.9 percent offer one-on-one counseling, 62 percent offer advice through the internet, 55.5 percent offer a telephone hotline. Less popular are web conferences offered by 18.2 percent.
In terms of who develops the educational programs, we asked plans whether they created the programs in-house or contracted a third party to develop them. A third party could include the contracted record keeper or a company hired specifically to help with education. Table 6 presents  the results. This table is sorted in the same order as Table 5 , therefore the most available options to actives are listed first. The percentages are based on the number of plans that offer each option. Therefore, the rows sum to 100 percent. Interestingly, the public plans are very involved in the development of their programs. The majority of the programs are either developed by the plan inhouse or in conjunction with a third party. In most cases, with the understandable exception of third party online advice, less than 35 percent of financial education is completely outsourced to a third party for development. In contrast, the 2010 PSCA report indicates that only 36 percent of retirement planning educational programs are offered by the plan sponsor. In a text response, we asked what third party groups were employed. Interestingly, a few plans had several different providers creating their financial education programs. For example, one firm designed their workshops, another firm handled communications and a third firm provided the advice. Figure 1 provides more insight into the different topics that are covered. Most types of educational offerings cover both plan specific and general financial knowledge topics. 12 Table 7 , Panels A and B include more detail regarding the popularity of the topics within each main area (plan specific and general). Table 7 , Panel A provides information about plan specific topics. Plans were permitted to choose more than one topic. In most cases, the most popular plan specific topic is a plan overview, with plan investment options and plan distribution options competing for second. Third party online advice is the only educational program that is more likely to cover plan investment options and distribution options than provide a plan overview. Regarding general financial topics (Table 7 , Panel B), retirement planning dominates all other topics in all but one case, with diversification, overview of assets and basic investment principles generally ranking second or third. Other topics that are covered by some plans but are not as popular as those listed include debt management, inflation, compound interest, and budgeting.
Finally, the plans list their main goals for financial education as improving overall retirement outcomes (95 percent), highlighting the importance of retirement savings (95 percent) and helping members make better investment decisions (90 percent). The PSCA reports list the most common reasons plans cite for their plan education is to increase participation (79 percent), to increase appreciation for the plan (77 percent) and to increase deferrals (74 percent). Increasing participation and increasing deferrals could both fit under the classification of improving overall retirement outcomes. Thus, the results are fairly consistent. However, increasing the appreciation for the plan was not an option provided as a possible response in the survey so it is not clear whether this is a factor for public plans
We also asked respondents whether they measured the success of their programs, and their responses are in Table 8 . As the earlier literature review suggests, this is relevant because not all educational methods are effective overall or for specific groups. We find roughly eighty percent of our DC and hybrid plans surveyed measure success. Based on the total surveyed DC and hybrid plans indicating they measure success, about 90 percent use surveys and attendance records to assess performance. These approaches are often useful for capturing participant satisfaction but, as previously discussed in Section 3, can fall short if participants are not following through with what they have learned. In terms of following actual member decisions made, about 40 percent of plans track default rates and just 35 percent follow actual participant behavior. Only two plan have employed an experimental field study to test for statistically significant changes in behaviors.
With regards to tracking defaults, the Florida Retirement System (FRS) provides a useful case study to illustrate how plans measure success related to defaults. The FRS gave us permission to include and discuss their results. For background, the FRS is the fourth largest public pension plan in the U.S. in size and since 2002 has required new public employees within the first five months of hire to decide whether they want to participate in the DB plan, called the FRS Pension Plan, or the DC option, referred to as the FRS Investment Plan. This is a critical retirement decision for new employees, complicated by the fact that they have limited time to make their choice, while at the same time starting a new job. If no election is made, workers are defaulted into the Pension Plan. These participants are also given one 2 nd election opportunity to switch plans during their active career. 13 The State Board of Administration of Florida (SBA) manages the Investment Plan and has the responsibility to help members choose the appropriate plan through financial education and planning tools. An important goal set by the SBA is to promote active and informed decision-making. As a result, they track the default choices made by new employees and strive to ensure that members defaulting do so actively. 14 Towards this goal, they hired a third party in 2005 to improve and simplify their plan communications using focus groups to guide the process. They refined the communication and education products over the 2007-2010 time frame. Figure 2 presents a chart that displays how the default rate has declined over time. They estimate that up to 41 percent of those listed as defaulters did so actively. The declining default rate suggests that the communications methods may have worked. However, further econometric analysis is warranted to judge significance. Regardless, Florida provides an excellent example of how one plan is actively following and evaluating decision-making around their education program. They are taking an important step beyond measuring satisfaction with educational materials that others may wish to follow.
Finally, respondents were given the opportunity to provide free text responses to discuss the issues they face offering educational programs and what they would like to know about other public plans. The responses to questions asking respondents what they view as the single largest problem with financial education gives valuable insight into the challenges facing plans. Several plans mentioned that their members' lack of financial literacy/sophistication was an issue, as was helping a diverse membership that includes a broad range of investing expertise and interest level. Several plans mentioned that getting the message to start saving early for retirement was difficult to deliver, as well as encouraging individuals to act on the information they are given. In particular, reaching young people was a common concern. Two plans also mentioned budget constraints.
Interestingly, one firm mentioned concern over crossing the line into financial advice. This comment reveals that the legal issues discussed earlier related to education and advice may affect some public plans. Finally, two plans mentioned the need to better reach out to members at important life milestones. The number of responses to the question asking plans what they would like to know about what other plans are doing demonstrated a general interest in learning more about best practices. Methods for evaluating plan success, encouraging young workers to engage and save, and promoting supplemental savings were topics of interest. One plan wanted to know whether members value in-person education or if they prefer new electronic methods. Additionally, they wondered if life events are targeted. 13 After eight years of service in the FRS Pension Plan or FRS Investment Plan (five years for members hired prior to July 1, 2011), members may also choose to participate in the FRS Investment Plan Hybrid Option. 14 This means their intention is to participate in the Pension Plan and they knowingly allowed themselves to be defaulted into it.
Overall, the survey results suggest that large state primary public DC and hybrid systems are offering a variety of education programs and that the sponsors play a large role in their development. Plans are interested in measuring success but are more likely to use standard approaches like satisfaction surveys than more rigorous methods like tracking behavior or field studies. Nevertheless, the responses indicate an interest in improving educational approaches and measuring performance.
Finally, we did gather data on 40 primary state defined benefit only plans, representing about 5 million active members and $1 trillion in market assets. We close this section by contrasting our previous findings with this sample. Boston College's Public Plans Database (PPD) provides actuarial, financial, and membership data on 107 state plans, representing over 90 percent of total actives and assets covered by state plans. We identified 92 of these plans as being 'DB only.' After excluding the plans classified as 'DB Choice' and providing data updates when available, the entire sample of primary state defined benefit only plans encompasses about 10 million active members and $2 trillion in market assets. As a result our DB only sample, represents 43 percent of the total population of DB only plans, and about 50 percent of the active members and market assets. Not all of the DB only plans surveyed offer financial education, 80 percent of our surveyed sample does compared to 100 percent of our DC and hybrid sample. Plans not offering education were asked whether they would like to know about what other plans are doing with financial education. Interestingly, two DB plans not offering financial education specifically asked about the legal implications of offering education. Both were interested in learning more about the regulation, which indicates that there is some confusion about what is acceptable. Turning to those DB plans offering education, it is not surprising that the relative importance of some goals are different relative to the DC and hybrid plans. For example, when we look at our sample of 32 defined benefit only plans offering education, the importance of helping people make better investment decisions is only listed by about 40 percent of the plans. That said improving overall retirement outcomes (81 percent) and highlighting the importance of retirement saving (69 percent) are still chosen by a large number of plans and are consistent with the earlier sample. In general, comments from all types of DB plans echoed concerns voiced by earlier plans, such as how to engage the younger population. Finally, one plan expressed interest in how plans successfully locate member e-mails. Anecdotally, the researchers found that some very large plans had similar issues, making use of targeted e-mails and follow ups very difficult.
Conclusions and Implications
Prior literature suggests that financial literacy is low in the United States. This is a concern as the shift from defined benefit plans to defined contribution and hybrid arrangements continues in both the private and public sector. While the shift is near complete in the private sector, the public sector has lagged behind and only now is experiencing a major transition. Given the complicated decisions employees face in non-DB plans, employers must carefully consider whether to offer financial education and advice to help their members with important choices. The literature suggests that these efforts can be helpful and new research applying more rigorous testing of effectiveness through field studies promises to provide greater insight into what methodologies will lead to better outcomes.
While surveys addressing financial education in private plans are available, little is known about what is offered in public plans. In addition, given the different characteristics of public sector workers and the variable legal environment facing public plans with respect to education and advice programs, it cannot be assumed that the private plan findings apply directly to public plans. To address this, this paper provides a new analysis of the public market, specifically focusing on large state systems with primary DC and/or hybrid plans. We find that some form of education or advice is offered in every surveyed plan and that the sponsoring entity is very involved in the development of the program. However, it appears that legal uncertainties may be a problem for a few plans.
While many plans attempt to measure success, these plans most frequently use methods such as seminar attendance and surveys to judge performance, which at times can be poor measures of effectiveness. Only 41 percent tracked the default rate on important decisions and 35 percent tracked actual post education behavior. These low percentages leave room in many plans for more rigorous evaluation.
The text responses by survey respondents provide further insight into the challenges facing public plans and indicate that many plans are seeking ways to improve their financial education. In some cases, budget issues can make this a difficult task. In fact, seventy one percent of our sample indicate that with an unlimited budget they would direct more to financial education. Additionally, many plans of different types indicated in the survey that they would be willing to allow further analysis of their approaches to education. In light of this expressed interest, budgetary concerns and desire for improvement, public plans may benefit by forming partnerships with academics interested in testing financial education delivery methods. Such partnerships would allow plans to rigorously test their offerings in a cost effective manner while providing academics an opportunity to further research in their field. Published research would also benefit other plans developing programs.
For academics, studying financial education in public plans provides many interesting research opportunities. Important areas of study that require more in depth analysis include determining what types of members are attracted to various types of educational programs. Is there a bias? Are members that are more inclined to act also more likely to attend events or use resources available? If so, are there effective ways to reach those who do not voluntarily attend or seek assistance? Could mandatory training work? Given the documented risk aversion of public employees, are there more effective ways of reaching this group? What role can e-mail reminders and just-in-time education play in nudging members into action? Can financial education and advice lead to more long-term satisfaction with the decisions that are made? What particular educational methods are most likely to engage and motivate younger employees? These are just a few of the important unanswered questions in this area.
In conclusion, this paper provides a basic review of current educational and advice practices in the public sector and identifies areas in need of improvement. These areas of concern present opportunities for academics and sponsors of public plans to work together to help members achieve better retirement outcomes. Given the new analysis methods being used in the research literature and the advances in the behavioral finance field, the future for better program evaluation and the potential for developing new and innovative ways to educate and provide advice looks promising. summary of all the major primary statewide retirement savings plans and also includes many smaller state plans administered only for certain employee groups. It is the most comprehensive list of these plans to date but may omit some smaller plans that could not be identified. All discovered plan design changes through June 2012 are reflected in the table, including prospective changes that have been recently legislated. The table includes a list of employee types covered by the plans, the date the plans began and an indicator (*C) for plans that are closed to new members. If the state offers many plans under one large system, the state plan options are indented under the main system heading. The plan options may include closed plans. In addition, the column entitled Primary Plan Options provides details regarding how NEW members in currently active plans choose their plan. For closed plans, it highlights how the plan was chosen by NEW employees when it was open. 'DB only' indicates that a defined benefit plan is the only plan available to employees. 'DC choice', 'DB choice' and 'Hybrid choice' labels indicate defined contribution, defined benefit, and hybrid plans that are part of a choice set. In some cases, a plan can be a 'DB only' option for a majority of the employees but then for a subset of employees exist as a plan offered in a choice set. In this case, the plan categorization that comes first applies to most employees. Plans that are part of a choice set for employees are bolded. The default plan in a choice set is denoted with a D superscript. A * indicated that the information could not be located. Extensive table notes are available upon request. For the survey, we targeted large state primary DC and hybrid plans and newly introduced plans that are expected to cover a substantial number of members in the future. All plans were opened prior to June 2012. Plans that have active members but are closed to new employees are denoted with a *C following their name. The tables include the year the plan was enacted for new hires, approximate current active members and approximate plan assets. Panel A presents DC and hybrid plans that are mandatory plans for their employees. Panel B presents DC and hybrid plans that are offered as part of an employee's choice set. 
Panel A. Mandatory DC and Hybrid Plans

4: Plan Features of Plans Surveyed
This table reports the percentage of plans surveyed that offer specific plan features and whether these features are available to most employees or just new hires. The 'New Hires Only' and 'Most Employees' column sum to the percentage of plans offering the feature (any differences observed are due to rounding).
Table 5: Financial Education and Advice Offerings in DC and Hybrid Primary State Plans
This table ranks financial education and advice offerings based on the actives eligible for each program and displays the percentage of plans offering each provision.
Table 6: Who Develops the Financial Education and Advice Programs?
This table reports the number of plans that offer each type of educational and advice program by who develops the program. The program can be developed in-house by the plan, outsourced to a third party or developed in conjunction with a third party. The percentages by row sum to 100 percent as they represent the percentage of plans surveyed that offer each specific type of education or advice. This table reports how plans measure success in their financial education and advice programs. The percentage is based on the number of plans who report measuring success.
Figure 1: Type of Financial Education Topics Covered Within Each Type of Educational/Advice Program
This figure shows the type of topics covered by different plans within each type of financial education and advice program. 
